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d1259ce Junio C Hamano 17 March 2020, 20:42:38 UTC Git 2.20.3 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 17 March 2020, 20:46:10 UTC
a5979d7 Junio C Hamano 17 March 2020, 20:37:37 UTC Git 2.19.4 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 17 March 2020, 20:43:08 UTC
21a3e50 Junio C Hamano 17 March 2020, 20:34:12 UTC Git 2.18.3 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 17 March 2020, 20:34:12 UTC
c42c0f1 Junio C Hamano 17 March 2020, 20:23:48 UTC Git 2.17.4 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 17 March 2020, 20:25:33 UTC
07259e7 Jeff King 11 March 2020, 22:48:24 UTC fsck: detect gitmodules URLs with embedded newlines The credential protocol can't handle values with newlines. We already detect and block any such URLs from being used with credential helpers, but let's also add an fsck check to detect and block gitmodules files with such URLs. That will let us notice the problem earlier when transfer.fsckObjects is turned on. And in particular it will prevent bad objects from spreading, which may protect downstream users running older versions of Git. We'll file this under the existing gitmodulesUrl flag, which covers URLs with option injection. There's really no need to distinguish the exact flaw in the URL in this context. Likewise, I've expanded the description of t7416 to cover all types of bogus URLs. 12 March 2020, 06:56:50 UTC
c716fe4 Jeff King 12 March 2020, 05:31:11 UTC credential: detect unrepresentable values when parsing urls The credential protocol can't represent newlines in values, but URLs can embed percent-encoded newlines in various components. A previous commit taught the low-level writing routines to die() when encountering this, but we can be a little friendlier to the user by detecting them earlier and handling them gracefully. This patch teaches credential_from_url() to notice such components, issue a warning, and blank the credential (which will generally result in prompting the user for a username and password). We blank the whole credential in this case. Another option would be to blank only the invalid component. However, we're probably better off not feeding a partially-parsed URL result to a credential helper. We don't know how a given helper would handle it, so we're better off to err on the side of matching nothing rather than something unexpected. The die() call in credential_write() is _probably_ impossible to reach after this patch. Values should end up in credential structs only by URL parsing (which is covered here), or by reading credential protocol input (which by definition cannot read a newline into a value). But we should definitely keep the low-level check, as it's our final and most accurate line of defense against protocol injection attacks. Arguably it could become a BUG(), but it probably doesn't matter much either way. Note that the public interface of credential_from_url() grows a little more than we need here. We'll use the extra flexibility in a future patch to help fsck catch these cases. 12 March 2020, 06:55:24 UTC
17f1c0b Jeff King 11 March 2020, 22:11:37 UTC t/lib-credential: use test_i18ncmp to check stderr The credential tests have a "check" function which feeds some input to git-credential and checks the stdout and stderr. We look for exact matches in the output. For stdout, this makes sense; the output is the credential protocol. But for stderr, we may be showing various diagnostic messages, or the prompts fed to the askpass program, which could be translated. Let's mark them as such. 12 March 2020, 06:55:17 UTC
9a6bbee Jeff King 11 March 2020, 21:53:41 UTC credential: avoid writing values with newlines The credential protocol that we use to speak to helpers can't represent values with newlines in them. This was an intentional design choice to keep the protocol simple, since none of the values we pass should generally have newlines. However, if we _do_ encounter a newline in a value, we blindly transmit it in credential_write(). Such values may break the protocol syntax, or worse, inject new valid lines into the protocol stream. The most likely way for a newline to end up in a credential struct is by decoding a URL with a percent-encoded newline. However, since the bug occurs at the moment we write the value to the protocol, we'll catch it there. That should leave no possibility of accidentally missing a code path that can trigger the problem. At this level of the code we have little choice but to die(). However, since we'd not ever expect to see this case outside of a malicious URL, that's an acceptable outcome. Reported-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com> 12 March 2020, 06:55:16 UTC
4cd1cf3 Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 21:33:15 UTC Git 2.20.2 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:30:51 UTC
c154745 Jonathan Nieder 05 December 2019, 09:28:28 UTC submodule: defend against submodule.update = !command in .gitmodules In v2.15.4, we started to reject `submodule.update` settings in `.gitmodules`. Let's raise a BUG if it somehow still made it through from anywhere but the Git config. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:30:50 UTC
4cfc47d Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 09:06:08 UTC t7415: adjust test for dubiously-nested submodule gitdirs for v2.20.x In v2.20.x, Git clones submodules recursively by first creating the submodules' gitdirs and _then_ "updating" the submodules. This can lead to the situation where the clone path is taken because the directory (while it exists already) is not a git directory, but then the clone fails because that gitdir is unexpectedly already a directory. This _also_ works around the vulnerability that was fixed in "Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories", but it produces a different error message than the one expected by the test case, therefore we adjust the test case accordingly. Note: as the two submodules "race each other", there are actually two possible error messages, therefore we have to teach the test case to expect _two_ possible (and good) outcomes in addition to the one it expected before. Note: this workaround is only necessary for the v2.20.x release train; The behavior changed again in v2.21.x so that the original test case's expectations are met again. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:30:50 UTC
d851d94 Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 21:31:10 UTC Sync with 2.19.3 * maint-2.19: (34 commits) Git 2.19.3 Git 2.18.2 Git 2.17.3 Git 2.16.6 test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()` Git 2.15.4 Git 2.14.6 mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives" mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting mingw: fix quoting of arguments Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams ... 06 December 2019, 15:30:49 UTC
caccc52 Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 21:29:33 UTC Git 2.19.3 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:30:40 UTC
7c9fbda Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 21:27:04 UTC Sync with 2.18.2 * maint-2.18: (33 commits) Git 2.18.2 Git 2.17.3 Git 2.16.6 test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()` Git 2.15.4 Git 2.14.6 mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives" mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting mingw: fix quoting of arguments Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up ... 06 December 2019, 15:30:38 UTC
9877106 Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 21:22:52 UTC Git 2.18.2 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:29:17 UTC
14af7ed Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 21:21:20 UTC Sync with 2.17.3 * maint-2.17: (32 commits) Git 2.17.3 Git 2.16.6 test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()` Git 2.15.4 Git 2.14.6 mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives" mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting mingw: fix quoting of arguments Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names ... 06 December 2019, 15:29:15 UTC
a5ab8d0 Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 21:13:04 UTC Git 2.17.3 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:27:38 UTC
bb92255 Jonathan Nieder 05 December 2019, 09:30:43 UTC fsck: reject submodule.update = !command in .gitmodules This allows hosting providers to detect whether they are being used to attack users using malicious 'update = !command' settings in .gitmodules. Since ac1fbbda2013 (submodule: do not copy unknown update mode from .gitmodules, 2013-12-02), in normal cases such settings have been treated as 'update = none', so forbidding them should not produce any collateral damage to legitimate uses. A quick search does not reveal any repositories making use of this construct, either. Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:27:38 UTC
bdfef04 Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 20:52:10 UTC Sync with 2.16.6 * maint-2.16: (31 commits) Git 2.16.6 test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()` Git 2.15.4 Git 2.14.6 mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives" mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting mingw: fix quoting of arguments Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names path: safeguard `.git` against NTFS Alternate Streams Accesses ... 06 December 2019, 15:27:36 UTC
eb288bc Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 20:45:07 UTC Git 2.16.6 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:27:20 UTC
6844049 Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 20:40:01 UTC test-drop-caches: use `has_dos_drive_prefix()` This is a companion patch to 'mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives"': use the DOS drive prefix handling that is already provided by `compat/mingw.c` (and which just learned to handle non-alphabetical "drive letters"). Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:27:20 UTC
9ac92fe Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 20:38:25 UTC Sync with 2.15.4 * maint-2.15: (29 commits) Git 2.15.4 Git 2.14.6 mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives" mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting mingw: fix quoting of arguments Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names path: safeguard `.git` against NTFS Alternate Streams Accesses clone --recurse-submodules: prevent name squatting on Windows is_ntfs_dotgit(): only verify the leading segment ... 06 December 2019, 15:27:18 UTC
7cdafca Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 20:33:29 UTC Git 2.15.4 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:26:58 UTC
e904deb Jonathan Nieder 05 December 2019, 09:28:28 UTC submodule: reject submodule.update = !command in .gitmodules Since ac1fbbda2013 (submodule: do not copy unknown update mode from .gitmodules, 2013-12-02), Git has been careful to avoid copying [submodule "foo"] update = !run an arbitrary scary command from .gitmodules to a repository's local config, copying in the setting 'update = none' instead. The gitmodules(5) manpage documents the intention: The !command form is intentionally ignored here for security reasons Unfortunately, starting with v2.20.0-rc0 (which integrated ee69b2a9 (submodule--helper: introduce new update-module-mode helper, 2018-08-13, first released in v2.20.0-rc0)), there are scenarios where we *don't* ignore it: if the config store contains no submodule.foo.update setting, the submodule-config API falls back to reading .gitmodules and the repository-supplied !command gets run after all. This was part of a general change over time in submodule support to read more directly from .gitmodules, since unlike .git/config it allows a project to change values between branches and over time (while still allowing .git/config to override things). But it was never intended to apply to this kind of dangerous configuration. The behavior change was not advertised in ee69b2a9's commit message and was missed in review. Let's take the opportunity to make the protection more robust, even in Git versions that are technically not affected: instead of quietly converting 'update = !command' to 'update = none', noisily treat it as an error. Allowing the setting but treating it as meaning something else was just confusing; users are better served by seeing the error sooner. Forbidding the construct makes the semantics simpler and means we can check for it in fsck (in a separate patch). As a result, the submodule-config API cannot read this value from .gitmodules under any circumstance, and we can declare with confidence For security reasons, the '!command' form is not accepted here. Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:26:58 UTC
d3ac8c3 Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 20:26:31 UTC Sync with 2.14.6 * maint-2.14: (28 commits) Git 2.14.6 mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives" mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting mingw: fix quoting of arguments Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default path: also guard `.gitmodules` against NTFS Alternate Data Streams is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names path: safeguard `.git` against NTFS Alternate Streams Accesses clone --recurse-submodules: prevent name squatting on Windows is_ntfs_dotgit(): only verify the leading segment test-path-utils: offer to run a protectNTFS/protectHFS benchmark ... 06 December 2019, 15:26:55 UTC
66d2a61 Johannes Schindelin 04 December 2019, 18:58:46 UTC Git 2.14.6 Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 06 December 2019, 15:26:15 UTC
2ddcccf Johannes Schindelin 16 September 2019, 11:26:40 UTC Merge branch 'win32-accommodate-funny-drive-names' While the only permitted drive letters for physical drives on Windows are letters of the US-English alphabet, this restriction does not apply to virtual drives assigned via `subst <letter>: <path>`. To prevent targeted attacks against systems where "funny" drive letters such as `1` or `!` are assigned, let's handle them as regular drive letters on Windows. This fixes CVE-2019-1351. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:09 UTC
65d30a1 Johannes Schindelin 16 September 2019, 11:26:40 UTC Merge branch 'win32-filenames-cannot-have-trailing-spaces-or-periods' On Windows, filenames cannot have trailing spaces or periods, when opening such paths, they are stripped automatically. Read: you can open the file `README` via the file name `README . . .`. This ambiguity can be used in combination with other security bugs to cause e.g. remote code execution during recursive clones. This patch series fixes that. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:09 UTC
5532ebd Johannes Schindelin 16 September 2019, 11:26:40 UTC Merge branch 'fix-mingw-quoting-bug' This patch fixes a vulnerability in the Windows-specific code where a submodule names ending in a backslash were quoted incorrectly, and that bug could be abused to insert command-line parameters e.g. to `ssh` in a recursive clone. Note: this bug is Windows-only, as we have to construct a command line for the process-to-spawn, unlike Linux/macOS, where `execv()` accepts an already-split command line. While at it, other quoting issues are fixed as well. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:08 UTC
76a681c Johannes Schindelin 02 October 2019, 11:08:45 UTC Merge branch 'dubiously-nested-submodules' Recursive clones are currently affected by a vulnerability that is caused by too-lax validation of submodule names. This topic branch fixes that. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:08 UTC
dd53ea7 Johannes Schindelin 16 September 2019, 11:26:40 UTC Merge branch 'turn-on-protectntfs-by-default' This patch series makes it safe to use Git on Windows drives, even if running on a mounted network share or within the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL). This topic branch addresses CVE-2019-1353. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:08 UTC
7f3551d Johannes Schindelin 16 September 2019, 11:26:40 UTC Merge branch 'disallow-dotgit-via-ntfs-alternate-data-streams' This patch series plugs an attack vector we had overlooked in our December 2014 work on `core.protectNTFS`. Essentially, the path `.git::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/config` is interpreted as `.git/config` when NTFS Alternate Data Streams are available (which they are on Windows, and at least on network shares that are SMB-mounted on macOS). Needless to say: we don't want that. In fact, we want to stay on the very safe side and not even special-case the `$INDEX_ALLOCATION` stream type: let's just prevent Git from touching _any_ explicitly specified Alternate Data Stream of `.git`. In essence, we'll prevent Git from tracking, or writing to, any path with a segment of the form `.git:<anything>`. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:07 UTC
f82a97e Johannes Schindelin 05 September 2019, 22:09:10 UTC mingw: handle `subst`-ed "DOS drives" Over a decade ago, in 25fe217b86c (Windows: Treat Windows style path names., 2008-03-05), Git was taught to handle absolute Windows paths, i.e. paths that start with a drive letter and a colon. Unbeknownst to us, while drive letters of physical drives are limited to letters of the English alphabet, there is a way to assign virtual drive letters to arbitrary directories, via the `subst` command, which is _not_ limited to English letters. It is therefore possible to have absolute Windows paths of the form `1:\what\the\hex.txt`. Even "better": pretty much arbitrary Unicode letters can also be used, e.g. `ä:\tschibät.sch`. While it can be sensibly argued that users who set up such funny drive letters really seek adverse consequences, the Windows Operating System is known to be a platform where many users are at the mercy of administrators who have their very own idea of what constitutes a reasonable setup. Therefore, let's just make sure that such funny paths are still considered absolute paths by Git, on Windows. In addition to Unicode characters, pretty much any character is a valid drive letter, as far as `subst` is concerned, even `:` and `"` or even a space character. While it is probably the opposite of smart to use them, let's safeguard `is_dos_drive_prefix()` against all of them. Note: `[::1]:repo` is a valid URL, but not a valid path on Windows. As `[` is now considered a valid drive letter, we need to be very careful to avoid misinterpreting such a string as valid local path in `url_is_local_not_ssh()`. To do that, we use the just-introduced function `is_valid_path()` (which will label the string as invalid file name because of the colon characters). This fixes CVE-2019-1351. Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:07 UTC
379e51d Johannes Schindelin 19 September 2019, 22:12:37 UTC quote-stress-test: offer to test quoting arguments for MSYS2 sh It is unfortunate that we need to quote arguments differently on Windows, depending whether we build a command-line for MSYS2's `sh` or for other Windows executables. We already have a test helper to verify the latter, with this patch we can also verify the former. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:06 UTC
7530a62 Johannes Schindelin 19 September 2019, 21:46:31 UTC quote-stress-test: allow skipping some trials When the, say, 93rd trial run fails, it is a good idea to have a way to skip the first 92 trials and dig directly into the 93rd in a debugger. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:06 UTC
817ddd6 Johannes Schindelin 05 September 2019, 11:44:21 UTC mingw: refuse to access paths with illegal characters Certain characters are not admissible in file names on Windows, even if Cygwin/MSYS2 (and therefore, Git for Windows' Bash) pretend that they are, e.g. `:`, `<`, `>`, etc Let's disallow those characters explicitly in Windows builds of Git. Note: just like trailing spaces or periods, it _is_ possible on Windows to create commits adding files with such illegal characters, as long as the operation leaves the worktree untouched. To allow for that, we continue to guard `is_valid_win32_path()` behind the config setting `core.protectNTFS`, so that users _can_ continue to do that, as long as they turn the protections off via that config setting. Among other problems, this prevents Git from trying to write to an "NTFS Alternate Data Stream" (which refers to metadata stored alongside a file, under a special name: "<filename>:<stream-name>"). This fix therefore also prevents an attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of recently-fixed security bugs. Further reading on illegal characters in Win32 filenames: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/fileio/naming-a-file Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:06 UTC
d2c84da Johannes Schindelin 05 September 2019, 11:27:53 UTC mingw: refuse to access paths with trailing spaces or periods When creating a directory on Windows whose path ends in a space or a period (or chains thereof), the Win32 API "helpfully" trims those. For example, `mkdir("abc ");` will return success, but actually create a directory called `abc` instead. This stems back to the DOS days, when all file names had exactly 8 characters plus exactly 3 characters for the file extension, and the only way to have shorter names was by padding with spaces. Sadly, this "helpful" behavior is a bit inconsistent: after a successful `mkdir("abc ");`, a `mkdir("abc /def")` will actually _fail_ (because the directory `abc ` does not actually exist). Even if it would work, we now have a serious problem because a Git repository could contain directories `abc` and `abc `, and on Windows, they would be "merged" unintentionally. As these paths are illegal on Windows, anyway, let's disallow any accesses to such paths on that Operating System. For practical reasons, this behavior is still guarded by the config setting `core.protectNTFS`: it is possible (and at least two regression tests make use of it) to create commits without involving the worktree. In such a scenario, it is of course possible -- even on Windows -- to create such file names. Among other consequences, this patch disallows submodules' paths to end in spaces on Windows (which would formerly have confused Git enough to try to write into incorrect paths, anyway). While this patch does not fix a vulnerability on its own, it prevents an attack vector that was exploited in demonstrations of a number of recently-fixed security bugs. The regression test added to `t/t7417-submodule-path-url.sh` reflects that attack vector. Note that we have to adjust the test case "prevent git~1 squatting on Windows" in `t/t7415-submodule-names.sh` because of a very subtle issue. It tries to clone two submodules whose names differ only in a trailing period character, and as a consequence their git directories differ in the same way. Previously, when Git tried to clone the second submodule, it thought that the git directory already existed (because on Windows, when you create a directory with the name `b.` it actually creates `b`), but with this patch, the first submodule's clone will fail because of the illegal name of the git directory. Therefore, when cloning the second submodule, Git will take a different code path: a fresh clone (without an existing git directory). Both code paths fail to clone the second submodule, both because the the corresponding worktree directory exists and is not empty, but the error messages are worded differently. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:06 UTC
cc756ed Johannes Schindelin 09 September 2019, 11:56:15 UTC unpack-trees: let merged_entry() pass through do_add_entry()'s errors A `git clone` will end with exit code 0 when `merged_entry()` returns a positive value during a call of `unpack_trees()` to `traverse_trees()`. The reason is that `unpack_trees()` will interpret a positive value not to be an error. The problem is, however, that `add_index_entry()` (which is called by `merged_entry()` can report an error, and we really should fail the entire clone in such a case. Let's fix this problem, in preparation for a Windows-specific patch disallowing `mkdir()` with directory names that contain a trailing space (which is illegal on NTFS): we want `git clone` to abort when a path cannot be checked out due to that condition. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:06 UTC
35edce2 Johannes Schindelin 09 September 2019, 13:43:35 UTC t6130/t9350: prepare for stringent Win32 path validation On Windows, file names cannot contain asterisks nor newline characters. In an upcoming commit, we will make this limitation explicit, disallowing even the creation of commits that introduce such file names. However, in the test scripts touched by this patch, we _know_ that those paths won't be checked out, so we _want_ to allow such file names. Happily, the stringent path validation will be guarded via the `core.protectNTFS` flag, so all we need to do is to force that flag off temporarily. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:37:06 UTC
55953c7 Johannes Schindelin 20 September 2019, 17:09:39 UTC quote-stress-test: accept arguments to test via the command-line When the stress test reported a problem with quoting certain arguments, it is helpful to have a facility to play with those arguments in order to find out whether variations of those arguments are affected, too. Let's allow `test-run-command quote-stress-test -- <args>` to be used for that purpose. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:36:53 UTC
ad15592 Garima Singh 18 September 2019, 20:03:59 UTC tests: add a helper to stress test argument quoting On Windows, we have to do all the command-line argument quoting ourselves. Worse: we have to have two versions of said quoting, one for MSYS2 programs (which have their own dequoting rules) and the rest. We care mostly about the rest, and to make sure that that works, let's have a stress test that comes up with all kinds of awkward arguments, verifying that a spawned sub-process receives those unharmed. Signed-off-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:36:52 UTC
6d86841 Johannes Schindelin 13 September 2019, 14:32:43 UTC mingw: fix quoting of arguments We need to be careful to follow proper quoting rules. For example, if an argument contains spaces, we have to quote them. Double-quotes need to be escaped. Backslashes need to be escaped, but only if they are followed by a double-quote character. We need to be _extra_ careful to consider the case where an argument ends in a backslash _and_ needs to be quoted: in this case, we append a double-quote character, i.e. the backslash now has to be escaped! The current code, however, fails to recognize that, and therefore can turn an argument that ends in a single backslash into a quoted argument that now ends in an escaped double-quote character. This allows subsequent command-line parameters to be split and part of them being mistaken for command-line options, e.g. through a maliciously-crafted submodule URL during a recursive clone. Technically, we would not need to quote _all_ arguments which end in a backslash _unless_ the argument needs to be quoted anyway. For example, `test\` would not need to be quoted, while `test \` would need to be. To keep the code simple, however, and therefore easier to reason about and ensure its correctness, we now _always_ quote an argument that ends in a backslash. This addresses CVE-2019-1350. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:36:51 UTC
9102f95 Johannes Schindelin 09 September 2019, 19:04:41 UTC protect_ntfs: turn on NTFS protection by default Back in the DOS days, in the FAT file system, file names always consisted of a base name of length 8 plus a file extension of length 3. Shorter file names were simply padded with spaces to the full 8.3 format. Later, the FAT file system was taught to support _also_ longer names, with an 8.3 "short name" as primary file name. While at it, the same facility allowed formerly illegal file names, such as `.git` (empty base names were not allowed), which would have the "short name" `git~1` associated with it. For backwards-compatibility, NTFS supports alternative 8.3 short filenames, too, even if starting with Windows Vista, they are only generated on the system drive by default. We addressed the problem that the `.git/` directory can _also_ be accessed via `git~1/` (when short names are enabled) in 2b4c6efc821 (read-cache: optionally disallow NTFS .git variants, 2014-12-16), i.e. since Git v1.9.5, by introducing the config setting `core.protectNTFS` and enabling it by default on Windows. In the meantime, Windows 10 introduced the "Windows Subsystem for Linux" (short: WSL), i.e. a way to run Linux applications/distributions in a thinly-isolated subsystem on Windows (giving rise to many a "2016 is the Year of Linux on the Desktop" jokes). WSL is getting increasingly popular, also due to the painless way Linux application can operate directly ("natively") on files on Windows' file system: the Windows drives are mounted automatically (e.g. `C:` as `/mnt/c/`). Taken together, this means that we now have to enable the safe-guards of Git v1.9.5 also in WSL: it is possible to access a `.git` directory inside `/mnt/c/` via the 8.3 name `git~1` (unless short name generation was disabled manually). Since regular Linux distributions run in WSL, this means we have to enable `core.protectNTFS` at least on Linux, too. To enable Services for Macintosh in Windows NT to store so-called resource forks, NTFS introduced "Alternate Data Streams". Essentially, these constitute additional metadata that are connected to (and copied with) their associated files, and they are accessed via pseudo file names of the form `filename:<stream-name>:<stream-type>`. In a recent patch, we extended `core.protectNTFS` to also protect against accesses via NTFS Alternate Data Streams, e.g. to prevent contents of the `.git/` directory to be "tracked" via yet another alternative file name. While it is not possible (at least by default) to access files via NTFS Alternate Data Streams from within WSL, the defaults on macOS when mounting network shares via SMB _do_ allow accessing files and directories in that way. Therefore, we need to enable `core.protectNTFS` on macOS by default, too, and really, on any Operating System that can mount network shares via SMB/CIFS. A couple of approaches were considered for fixing this: 1. We could perform a dynamic NTFS check similar to the `core.symlinks` check in `init`/`clone`: instead of trying to create a symbolic link in the `.git/` directory, we could create a test file and try to access `.git/config` via 8.3 name and/or Alternate Data Stream. 2. We could simply "flip the switch" on `core.protectNTFS`, to make it "on by default". The obvious downside of 1. is that it won't protect worktrees that were clone with a vulnerable Git version already. We considered patching code paths that check out files to check whether we're running on an NTFS system dynamically and persist the result in the repository-local config setting `core.protectNTFS`, but in the end decided that this solution would be too fragile, and too involved. The obvious downside of 2. is that everybody will have to "suffer" the performance penalty incurred from calling `is_ntfs_dotgit()` on every path, even in setups where. After the recent work to accelerate `is_ntfs_dotgit()` in most cases, it looks as if the time spent on validating ten million random file names increases only negligibly (less than 20ms, well within the standard deviation of ~50ms). Therefore the benefits outweigh the cost. Another downside of this is that paths that might have been acceptable previously now will be forbidden. Realistically, though, this is an improvement because public Git hosters already would reject any `git push` that contains such file names. Note: There might be a similar problem mounting HFS+ on Linux. However, this scenario has been considered unlikely and in light of the cost (in the aforementioned benchmark, `core.protectHFS = true` increased the time from ~440ms to ~610ms), it was decided _not_ to touch the default of `core.protectHFS`. This change addresses CVE-2019-1353. Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com> Helped-by: Garima Singh <garima.singh@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:36:51 UTC
3a85dc7 Johannes Schindelin 06 September 2019, 19:09:35 UTC is_ntfs_dotgit(): speed it up Previously, this function was written without focusing on speed, intending to make reviewing the code as easy as possible, to avoid any bugs in this critical code. Turns out: we can do much better on both accounts. With this patch, we make it as fast as this developer can make it go: - We avoid the call to `is_dir_sep()` and make all the character comparisons explicit. - We avoid the cost of calling `strncasecmp()` and unroll the test for `.git` and `git~1`, not even using `tolower()` because it is faster to compare against two constant values. - We look for `.git` and `.git~1` first thing, and return early if not found. - We also avoid calling a separate function for detecting chains of spaces and periods. Each of these improvements has a noticeable impact on the speed of `is_ntfs_dotgit()`. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:36:51 UTC
a8dee3c Johannes Schindelin 01 October 2019, 21:27:18 UTC Disallow dubiously-nested submodule git directories Currently it is technically possible to let a submodule's git directory point right into the git dir of a sibling submodule. Example: the git directories of two submodules with the names `hippo` and `hippo/hooks` would be `.git/modules/hippo/` and `.git/modules/hippo/hooks/`, respectively, but the latter is already intended to house the former's hooks. In most cases, this is just confusing, but there is also a (quite contrived) attack vector where Git can be fooled into mistaking remote content for file contents it wrote itself during a recursive clone. Let's plug this bug. To do so, we introduce the new function `validate_submodule_git_dir()` which simply verifies that no git dir exists for any leading directories of the submodule name (if there are any). Note: this patch specifically continues to allow sibling modules names of the form `core/lib`, `core/doc`, etc, as long as `core` is not a submodule name. This fixes CVE-2019-1387. Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 05 December 2019, 14:36:51 UTC
4778452 Johannes Schindelin 16 September 2019, 11:26:40 UTC Merge branch 'prevent-name-squatting-on-windows' This patch series fixes an issue where Git could formerly have been tricked into creating a `.git` file with an unexpected (and therefore unprotected) NTFS short name. Incidentally, it also fixes an issue where a tree entry containing a backslash could be tricked into following a symbolic link, i.e. Git could be tricked into writing files outside the worktree. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 04 December 2019, 12:23:22 UTC
a7b1ad3 Johannes Schindelin 03 October 2019, 18:44:34 UTC Merge branch 'jk/fast-import-unsafe' The `--export-marks` option of `git fast-import` is exposed also via the in-stream command `feature export-marks=...` and it allows overwriting arbitrary paths. This topic branch prevents the in-stream version, to prevent arbitrary file accesses by `git fast-import` streams coming from untrusted sources (e.g. in remote helpers that are based on `git fast-import`). This fixes CVE-2019-1348. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 04 December 2019, 12:23:22 UTC
e1d911d Johannes Schindelin 12 September 2019, 12:54:05 UTC mingw: disallow backslash characters in tree objects' file names The backslash character is not a valid part of a file name on Windows. Hence it is dangerous to allow writing files that were unpacked from tree objects, when the stored file name contains a backslash character: it will be misinterpreted as directory separator. This not only causes ambiguity when a tree contains a blob `a\b` and a tree `a` that contains a blob `b`, but it also can be used as part of an attack vector to side-step the careful protections against writing into the `.git/` directory during a clone of a maliciously-crafted repository. Let's prevent that, addressing CVE-2019-1354. Note: we guard against backslash characters in tree objects' file names _only_ on Windows (because on other platforms, even on those where NTFS volumes can be mounted, the backslash character is _not_ a directory separator), and _only_ when `core.protectNTFS = true` (because users might need to generate tree objects for other platforms, of course without touching the worktree, e.g. using `git update-index --cacheinfo`). Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 04 December 2019, 12:20:05 UTC
0060fd1 Johannes Schindelin 12 September 2019, 12:20:39 UTC clone --recurse-submodules: prevent name squatting on Windows In addition to preventing `.git` from being tracked by Git, on Windows we also have to prevent `git~1` from being tracked, as the default NTFS short name (also known as the "8.3 filename") for the file name `.git` is `git~1`, otherwise it would be possible for malicious repositories to write directly into the `.git/` directory, e.g. a `post-checkout` hook that would then be executed _during_ a recursive clone. When we implemented appropriate protections in 2b4c6efc821 (read-cache: optionally disallow NTFS .git variants, 2014-12-16), we had analyzed carefully that the `.git` directory or file would be guaranteed to be the first directory entry to be written. Otherwise it would be possible e.g. for a file named `..git` to be assigned the short name `git~1` and subsequently, the short name generated for `.git` would be `git~2`. Or `git~3`. Or even `~9999999` (for a detailed explanation of the lengths we have to go to protect `.gitmodules`, see the commit message of e7cb0b4455c (is_ntfs_dotgit: match other .git files, 2018-05-11)). However, by exploiting two issues (that will be addressed in a related patch series close by), it is currently possible to clone a submodule into a non-empty directory: - On Windows, file names cannot end in a space or a period (for historical reasons: the period separating the base name from the file extension was not actually written to disk, and the base name/file extension was space-padded to the full 8/3 characters, respectively). Helpfully, when creating a directory under the name, say, `sub.`, that trailing period is trimmed automatically and the actual name on disk is `sub`. This means that while Git thinks that the submodule names `sub` and `sub.` are different, they both access `.git/modules/sub/`. - While the backslash character is a valid file name character on Linux, it is not so on Windows. As Git tries to be cross-platform, it therefore allows backslash characters in the file names stored in tree objects. Which means that it is totally possible that a submodule `c` sits next to a file `c\..git`, and on Windows, during recursive clone a file called `..git` will be written into `c/`, of course _before_ the submodule is cloned. Note that the actual exploit is not quite as simple as having a submodule `c` next to a file `c\..git`, as we have to make sure that the directory `.git/modules/b` already exists when the submodule is checked out, otherwise a different code path is taken in `module_clone()` that does _not_ allow a non-empty submodule directory to exist already. Even if we will address both issues nearby (the next commit will disallow backslash characters in tree entries' file names on Windows, and another patch will disallow creating directories/files with trailing spaces or periods), it is a wise idea to defend in depth against this sort of attack vector: when submodules are cloned recursively, we now _require_ the directory to be empty, addressing CVE-2019-1349. Note: the code path we patch is shared with the code path of `git submodule update --init`, which must not expect, in general, that the directory is empty. Hence we have to introduce the new option `--force-init` and hand it all the way down from `git submodule` to the actual `git submodule--helper` process that performs the initial clone. Reported-by: Nicolas Joly <Nicolas.Joly@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> 04 December 2019, 12:20:05 UTC
a52ed76 Jeff King 29 August 2019, 19:08:42 UTC fast-import: disallow "feature import-marks" by default As with export-marks in the previous commit, import-marks can access the filesystem. This is significantly less dangerous than export-marks because it only involves reading from arbitrary paths, rather than writing them. However, it could still be surprising and have security implications (e.g., exfiltrating data from a service that accepts fast-import streams). Let's lump it (and its "if-exists" counterpart) in with export-marks, and enable the in-stream version only if --allow-unsafe-features is set. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> 04 December 2019, 12:20:04 UTC
68061e3 Jeff King 29 August 2019, 18:37:26 UTC fast-import: disallow "feature export-marks" by default The fast-import stream command "feature export-marks=<path>" lets the stream write marks to an arbitrary path. This may be surprising if you are running fast-import against an untrusted input (which otherwise cannot do anything except update Git objects and refs). Let's disallow the use of this feature by default, and provide a command-line option to re-enable it (you can always just use the command-line --export-marks as well, but the in-stream version provides an easy way for exporters to control the process). This is a backwards-incompatible change, since the default is flipping to the new, safer behavior. However, since the main users of the in-stream versions would be import/export-based remote helpers, and since we trust remote helpers already (which are already running arbitrary code), we'll pass the new option by default when reading a remote helper's stream. This should minimize the impact. Note that the implementation isn't totally simple, as we have to work around the fact that fast-import doesn't parse its command-line options until after it has read any "feature" lines from the stream. This is how it lets command-line options override in-stream. But in our case, it's important to parse the new --allow-unsafe-features first. There are three options for resolving this: 1. Do a separate "early" pass over the options. This is easy for us to do because there are no command-line options that allow the "unstuck" form (so there's no chance of us mistaking an argument for an option), though it does introduce a risk of incorrect parsing later (e.g,. if we convert to parse-options). 2. Move the option parsing phase back to the start of the program, but teach the stream-reading code never to override an existing value. This is tricky, because stream "feature" lines override each other (meaning we'd have to start tracking the source for every option). 3. Accept that we might parse a "feature export-marks" line that is forbidden, as long we don't _act_ on it until after we've parsed the command line options. This would, in fact, work with the current code, but only because the previous patch fixed the export-marks parser to avoid touching the filesystem. So while it works, it does carry risk of somebody getting it wrong in the future in a rather subtle and unsafe way. I've gone with option (1) here as simple, safe, and unlikely to cause regressions. This fixes CVE-2019-1348. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> 04 December 2019, 12:20:04 UTC
0196830 Jeff King 29 August 2019, 17:33:48 UTC fast-import: delay creating leading directories for export-marks When we parse the --export-marks option, we don't immediately open the file, but we do create any leading directories. This can be especially confusing when a command-line option overrides an in-stream one, in which case we'd create the leading directory for the in-stream file, even though we never actually write the file. Let's instead create the directories just before opening the file, which means we'll create only useful directories. Note that this could change the handling of relative paths if we chdir() in between, but we don't actually do so; the only permanent chdir is from setup_git_directory() which runs before either code path (potentially we should take the pre-setup dir into account to avoid surprising the user, but that's an orthogonal change). The test just adapts the existing "override" test to use paths with leading directories. This checks both that the correct directory is created (which worked before but was not tested), and that the overridden one is not (our new fix here). While we're here, let's also check the error result of safe_create_leading_directories(). We'd presumably notice any failure immediately after when we try to open the file itself, but we can give a more specific error message in this case. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> 04 December 2019, 12:20:04 UTC
e075dba Jeff King 29 August 2019, 17:07:04 UTC fast-import: stop creating leading directories for import-marks When asked to import marks from "subdir/file.marks", we create the leading directory "subdir" if it doesn't exist. This makes no sense for importing marks, where we only ever open the path for reading. Most of the time this would be a noop, since if the marks file exists, then the leading directories exist, too. But if it doesn't (e.g., because --import-marks-if-exists was used), then we'd create the useless directory. This dates back to 580d5f83e7 (fast-import: always create marks_file directories, 2010-03-29). Even then it was useless, so it seems to have been added in error alongside the --export-marks case (which _is_ helpful). Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> 04 December 2019, 12:20:04 UTC
11e934d Jeff King 29 August 2019, 15:25:45 UTC fast-import: tighten parsing of boolean command line options We parse options like "--max-pack-size=" using skip_prefix(), which makes sense to get at the bytes after the "=". However, we also parse "--quiet" and "--stats" with skip_prefix(), which allows things like "--quiet-nonsense" to behave like "--quiet". This was a mistaken conversion in 0f6927c229 (fast-import: put option parsing code in separate functions, 2009-12-04). Let's tighten this to an exact match, which was the original intent. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> 04 December 2019, 12:20:04 UTC
816f806 Jeff King 29 August 2019, 17:43:23 UTC t9300: create marks files for double-import-marks test Our tests confirm that providing two "import-marks" options in a fast-import stream is an error. However, the invoked command would fail even without covering this case, because the marks files themselves do not actually exist. Let's create the files to make sure we fail for the right reason (we actually do, because the option parsing happens before we open anything, but this future-proofs our test). Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> 04 December 2019, 12:20:03 UTC
f94804c Jeff King 29 August 2019, 15:19:18 UTC t9300: drop some useless uses of cat These waste a process, and make the line longer than it needs to be. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> 04 December 2019, 12:20:03 UTC
0d0ac38 Junio C Hamano 15 December 2018, 03:31:34 UTC Git 2.20.1 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 15 December 2018, 03:31:34 UTC
8324302 Junio C Hamano 15 December 2018, 03:24:34 UTC Merge branch 'jc/run-command-report-exec-failure-fix' into maint A recent update accidentally squelched an error message when the run_command API failed to run a missing command, which has been corrected. * jc/run-command-report-exec-failure-fix: run-command: report exec failure 15 December 2018, 03:24:34 UTC
916f56d Junio C Hamano 15 December 2018, 03:24:33 UTC Merge branch 'js/help-commands-verbose-by-default-fix' into maint "git help -a" did not work well when an overly long alias is defined, which has been corrected. * js/help-commands-verbose-by-default-fix: help -a: handle aliases with long names gracefully help.h: fix coding style 15 December 2018, 03:24:33 UTC
bf29f07 Junio C Hamano 15 December 2018, 03:24:33 UTC Merge branch 'nd/show-gitcomp-compilation-fix' into maint Portability fix for a recent update to parse-options API. * nd/show-gitcomp-compilation-fix: parse-options: fix SunCC compiler warning 15 December 2018, 03:24:33 UTC
6be6e66 Junio C Hamano 15 December 2018, 03:24:32 UTC Merge branch 'js/t9902-send-email-completion-fix' into maint * js/t9902-send-email-completion-fix: t9902: 'send-email' test case requires PERL 15 December 2018, 03:24:32 UTC
6cba471 Junio C Hamano 15 December 2018, 03:24:32 UTC Merge branch 'js/mailinfo-format-flowed-fix' into maint Test portability fix. * js/mailinfo-format-flowed-fix: t4256: mark support files as LF-only 15 December 2018, 03:24:32 UTC
3f8c27c Junio C Hamano 15 December 2018, 03:24:32 UTC Merge branch 'ds/hash-independent-tests-fix' into maint Test portability fix. * ds/hash-independent-tests-fix: .gitattributes: ensure t/oid-info/* has eol=lf 15 December 2018, 03:24:32 UTC
fc767af Derrick Stolee 11 December 2018, 20:35:46 UTC .gitattributes: ensure t/oid-info/* has eol=lf The new test_oid machinery in the test library requires reading some information from t/oid-info/hash-info and t/oid-info/oid. The logic to read from these files in shell uses built-in "read" command, which leaves CR at the end of these text files when they are checked out with CRLF line endings, at least when run with bash shipped with Git for Windows. This results in an unexpected value in the variable these lines are read into, leading the tests to fail. Mark them to be checked out always with the LF line endings. Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 14 December 2018, 03:53:06 UTC
0365b9e Johannes Schindelin 13 December 2018, 14:04:19 UTC t9902: 'send-email' test case requires PERL The oneline notwithstanding, 13374987dd (completion: use _gitcompbuiltin for format-patch, 2018-11-03) changed also the way send-email options are completed, by asking the git send-email command itself what options it offers. Necessarily, this must fail when built with NO_PERL because send-email itself is a Perl script. Which means that we need the PERL prerequisite for the send-email test case in t9902. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 14 December 2018, 02:56:02 UTC
98f2d93 Johannes Schindelin 12 December 2018, 18:14:54 UTC t4256: mark support files as LF-only The test t4256-am-format-flowed.sh requires carefully applying a patch after ignoring padding whitespace. This breaks if the file is munged to include CRLF line endings instead of LF. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 13 December 2018, 02:39:45 UTC
a92ec7e Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy 11 December 2018, 15:35:01 UTC parse-options: fix SunCC compiler warning The compiler reports this because show_gitcomp() never actually returns a value: "parse-options.c", line 520: warning: Function has no return statement : show_gitcomp We could shut the compiler up. But instead let's not bury exit() too deep. Do the same as internal -h handling, return a special error code and handle the exit() in parse_options() (and other parse_options_step() callers) instead. Reported-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nguyễn Thái Ngọc Duy <pclouds@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 12 December 2018, 08:21:33 UTC
1c4b985 Johannes Schindelin 11 December 2018, 14:58:11 UTC help -a: handle aliases with long names gracefully We take pains to determine the longest command beforehand, so that we can align the category column after printing the command names. However, then we re-use that value when printing the aliases. If any alias name is longer than the longest command name, we consequently try to add a negative number of spaces (but `mput_char()` does not expect any negative values and simply decrements until the value is 0, i.e. it tries to add close to 2**31 spaces). Let's fix this by adjusting the `longest` variable before printing the aliases. This fixes https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/issues/1975. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 12 December 2018, 08:18:38 UTC
5acea87 Johannes Schindelin 11 December 2018, 14:58:10 UTC help.h: fix coding style We want a space after the `while` keyword. Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 12 December 2018, 08:18:29 UTC
e5a329a Junio C Hamano 11 December 2018, 05:46:07 UTC run-command: report exec failure In 321fd823 ("run-command: mark path lookup errors with ENOENT", 2018-10-24), we rewrote the logic to execute a command by looking in the directories on $PATH; as a side effect, a request to run a command that is not found on $PATH is noticed even before a child process is forked to execute it. We however stopped to report an exec failure in such a case by mistake. Add a logic to report the error unless silent-exec-failure is requested, to match the original code. Reported-by: John Passaro <john.a.passaro@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 12 December 2018, 08:06:50 UTC
5d826e9 Junio C Hamano 09 December 2018, 04:16:21 UTC Git 2.20 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 09 December 2018, 04:16:21 UTC
b5796d9 Junio C Hamano 09 December 2018, 04:11:36 UTC Merge tag 'l10n-2.20.0-rnd3' of https://github.com/git-l10n/git-po l10n-2.20.0-rnd3 * tag 'l10n-2.20.0-rnd3' of https://github.com/git-l10n/git-po: (22 commits) l10n: de.po: fix two messages l10n: zh_CN: for git v2.20.0 l10n round 1 to 3 l10n: update German translation l10n: bg.po: Updated Bulgarian translation (4187t) l10n: sv.po: Update Swedish translation (4187t0f0u) l10n: fr.po v2.20.0 round 3 l10n: vi(4187t): Updated Vietnamese translation for v2.20.0 rd3 l10n: es.po v2.20.0 round 3 l10n: git.pot: v2.20.0 round 3 (5 new, 3 removed) l10n: vi(4185t): Updated Vietnamese translation for v2.20.0 l10n: es.po v2.20.0 round 1 l10n: bg.po: Updated Bulgarian translation (4185t) l10n: git.pot: v2.20.0 round 2 (2 new, 2 removed) l10n: bg.po: Updated Bulgarian translation (4185t) l10n: sv.po: Update Swedish translation (4185t0f0u) l10n: fr.po v2.20 rnd 1 l10n: Update Catalan translation l10n: git.pot: v2.20.0 round 1 (254 new, 27 removed) l10n: Update Catalan translation l10n: vi.po: fix typo in pack-objects ... 09 December 2018, 04:11:36 UTC
0688c55 Ralf Thielow 07 December 2018, 18:43:07 UTC l10n: de.po: fix two messages Reported-by: Phillip Szelat <phillip.szelat@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ralf Thielow <ralf.thielow@gmail.com> 07 December 2018, 18:43:07 UTC
4c27fcb Jiang Xin 20 November 2018, 02:18:06 UTC l10n: zh_CN: for git v2.20.0 l10n round 1 to 3 Translate 257 new messages (4187t0f0u) for git 2.20.0. Reviewed-by: Zhou Fangyi <fangyi.zhou@yuriko.moe> Reviewed-by: 依云 <lilydjwg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiang Xin <worldhello.net@gmail.com> 06 December 2018, 08:00:29 UTC
cf4c0c2 Ralf Thielow 06 December 2018, 06:44:41 UTC l10n: update German translation Signed-off-by: Ralf Thielow <ralf.thielow@gmail.com> 06 December 2018, 06:44:41 UTC
965798d Junio C Hamano 04 December 2018, 03:49:50 UTC Merge branch 'es/format-patch-range-diff-fix-fix' * es/format-patch-range-diff-fix-fix: range-diff: always pass at least minimal diff options 04 December 2018, 03:49:50 UTC
5335669 Junio C Hamano 04 December 2018, 03:49:39 UTC Merge branch 'en/rebase-consistency' * en/rebase-consistency: rebase docs: fix incorrect format of the section Behavioral Differences 04 December 2018, 03:49:39 UTC
6fcbad8 Johannes Sixt 03 December 2018, 17:34:49 UTC rebase docs: fix incorrect format of the section Behavioral Differences The text body of section Behavioral Differences is typeset as code, but should be regular text. Remove the indentation to achieve that. While here, prettify the language: - use "the x backend" instead of "x-based rebase"; - use present tense instead of future tense; and use subsections instead of a list. Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 04 December 2018, 02:50:52 UTC
7e75a63 Martin Ågren 03 December 2018, 20:21:51 UTC RelNotes 2.20: drop spurious double quote We have three double-quote characters, which is one too many or too few. Dropping the last one seems to match the original intention best. Signed-off-by: Martin Ågren <martin.agren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 04 December 2018, 02:26:40 UTC
7a49e44 Martin Ågren 03 December 2018, 20:21:50 UTC RelNotes 2.20: clarify sentence I had to read this sentence a few times to understand it. Let's try to clarify it. Signed-off-by: Martin Ågren <martin.agren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 04 December 2018, 02:26:38 UTC
00ac55c Martin Ågren 03 December 2018, 20:21:49 UTC RelNotes 2.20: move some items between sections Some items that should be in "Performance, Internal Implementation, Development Support etc." have ended up in "UI, Workflows & Features" and "Fixes since v2.19". Move them, and do s/uses/use/ while at it. Signed-off-by: Martin Ågren <martin.agren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 04 December 2018, 02:26:36 UTC
ac0edf1 Martin Ågren 03 December 2018, 21:21:31 UTC range-diff: always pass at least minimal diff options Commit d8981c3f88 ("format-patch: do not let its diff-options affect --range-diff", 2018-11-30) taught `show_range_diff()` to accept a NULL-pointer as an indication that it should use its own "reasonable default". That fixed a regression from a5170794 ("Merge branch 'ab/range-diff-no-patch'", 2018-11-18), but unfortunately it introduced a regression of its own. In particular, it means we forget the `file` member of the diff options, so rather than placing a range-diff in the cover-letter, we write it to stdout. In order to fix this, rewrite the two callers adjusted by d8981c3f88 to instead create a "dummy" set of diff options where they only fill in the fields we absolutely require, such as output file and color. Modify and extend the existing tests to try and verify that the right contents end up in the right place. Don't revert `show_range_diff()`, i.e., let it keep accepting NULL. Rather than removing what is dead code and figuring out it isn't actually dead and we've broken 2.20, just leave it for now. [es: retain diff coloring when going to stdout] Signed-off-by: Martin Ågren <martin.agren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Sunshine <sunshine@sunshineco.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 04 December 2018, 01:36:14 UTC
609713e Jiang Xin 03 December 2018, 04:49:45 UTC Merge branch 'master' of git://github.com/alshopov/git-po 03 December 2018, 04:49:45 UTC
9290395 Alexander Shopov 02 December 2018, 12:42:29 UTC l10n: bg.po: Updated Bulgarian translation (4187t) Signed-off-by: Alexander Shopov <ash@kambanaria.org> 02 December 2018, 15:09:21 UTC
7345044 Peter Krefting 02 December 2018, 14:43:34 UTC l10n: sv.po: Update Swedish translation (4187t0f0u) Signed-off-by: Peter Krefting <peter@softwolves.pp.se> 02 December 2018, 14:43:34 UTC
a8f5329 Jiang Xin 02 December 2018, 14:36:36 UTC Merge branch 'fr_2.20_round3' of git://github.com/jnavila/git 02 December 2018, 14:36:36 UTC
5386321 Jean-Noël Avila 02 December 2018, 10:03:23 UTC l10n: fr.po v2.20.0 round 3 Signed-off-by: Jean-Noël Avila <jn.avila@free.fr> 02 December 2018, 10:03:23 UTC
cd1eab5 Jiang Xin 02 December 2018, 09:57:24 UTC Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/vnwildman/git 02 December 2018, 09:57:24 UTC
8173e9c Tran Ngoc Quan 02 December 2018, 07:15:00 UTC l10n: vi(4187t): Updated Vietnamese translation for v2.20.0 rd3 Signed-off-by: Tran Ngoc Quan <vnwildman@gmail.com> 02 December 2018, 07:15:00 UTC
7c6767b Christopher Diaz Riveros 02 December 2018, 04:12:59 UTC l10n: es.po v2.20.0 round 3 Signed-off-by: Christopher Diaz Riveros <chrisadr@gentoo.org> 02 December 2018, 04:17:55 UTC
578d8ea Jiang Xin 02 December 2018, 02:56:26 UTC l10n: git.pot: v2.20.0 round 3 (5 new, 3 removed) Generate po/git.pot from v2.20.0-rc2 for git v2.20.0 l10n round 3. Signed-off-by: Jiang Xin <worldhello.net@gmail.com> 02 December 2018, 02:56:26 UTC
8a0ba68 Junio C Hamano 01 December 2018, 12:44:56 UTC Git 2.20-rc2 Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> 01 December 2018, 12:44:56 UTC
15cc2da Junio C Hamano 01 December 2018, 12:41:45 UTC Merge branch 'gh/diff-raw-has-no-ellipses' "git diff --raw" lost ellipses to adjust the output columns for some time now, but the documentation still showed them. * gh/diff-raw-has-no-ellipses: doc: update diff-format.txt for removed ellipses in --raw 01 December 2018, 12:41:45 UTC
c0e286a Junio C Hamano 01 December 2018, 12:41:45 UTC Merge branch 'ss/msvc-strcasecmp' MSVC update. * ss/msvc-strcasecmp: msvc: directly use MS version (_stricmp) of strcasecmp 01 December 2018, 12:41:45 UTC
6233704 Junio C Hamano 01 December 2018, 12:41:44 UTC Merge branch 'sg/test-BUG' test framework has been updated to make a bug in the test script (as opposed to bugs in Git that are discovered by running the tests) stand out more prominently. * sg/test-BUG: tests: send "bug in the test script" errors to the script's stderr 01 December 2018, 12:41:44 UTC
152cb0c Junio C Hamano 01 December 2018, 12:41:44 UTC Merge branch 'sg/test-cmp-rev' Test framework update. * sg/test-cmp-rev: test-lib-functions: make 'test_cmp_rev' more informative on failure 01 December 2018, 12:41:44 UTC
2c23f0b Junio C Hamano 01 December 2018, 12:41:44 UTC Merge branch 'ab/push-example-in-doc' An error message that sugggests how to give correct arguments to "git push" has been updated. * ab/push-example-in-doc: push: change needlessly ambiguous example in error 01 December 2018, 12:41:44 UTC
544d114 Junio C Hamano 01 December 2018, 12:41:44 UTC Merge branch 'rt/rebase-in-c-message-fix' * rt/rebase-in-c-message-fix: builtin/rebase.c: remove superfluous space in messages 01 December 2018, 12:41:44 UTC
97b6d63 Junio C Hamano 01 December 2018, 12:41:43 UTC Merge branch 'sg/daemon-test-signal-fix' Test fix. * sg/daemon-test-signal-fix: t/lib-git-daemon: fix signal checking 01 December 2018, 12:41:43 UTC
1efd0e8 Junio C Hamano 01 December 2018, 12:41:43 UTC Merge branch 'ma/reset-doc-rendering-fix' Doc updates. * ma/reset-doc-rendering-fix: git-reset.txt: render literal examples as monospace git-reset.txt: render tables correctly under Asciidoctor 01 December 2018, 12:41:43 UTC
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